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W. R. GRACE & CO.

V.

CAL. EMP. COM.

Aug. 1944)

[24 C.2d

Schauer, J., concurred.
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.

Aug. 18, 1944.]

W. R. GRACE & COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et aI., Respondents; FRANK ABELLEIRA et al.,
Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Mandamus-Defenses-Pendency of Another Action.-A writ
of mandamus is not so exceptional in nature that it is never
abated by the pendency of other litigation. Although it was
originally a high prerogative writ to which the plea of another
action pending was not available, it no longer depends on prerogative power and is by statute expressly subject to the rules
of practice applicable to other actions when there are no provisions otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.)
[2] Abatement - Pendency of Another Action - Mandamus Proceedings.-A writ of mandamus is denied if a similar application between the same parties on the same matter is already
pending before another court. The pendency of another action,
[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 763, 849; 34 Am.Jur. 811; 35 Am.Jur. 70.
[2] Action or suit as abating mandamus proceeding or vice
versa, note, 37 A.L.R. 1432. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 28, 31; 1 Am.Jur.
31,40.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 75; [2] Abatement and
Revival, §§ 17,19; [3-7,9-18] Unemployment Relief; [8] Statutes,
§ 184.
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(Stats. 1939, ch. 1085) required that payments be made
where the referee affirmed "an initial determination allowing benefits." In 1937 it provided that if a referee affirms
a decision of a deputy or the commission affirms a decision
of the referee allowing benefits, the benefits must be paid
regardless of the appeal. (Stats. 1937, p. 2059.) (See dissenting opinion in W. R. Grace & Co. v. California Emp.
Com., this day filed post, p. 734 [151 P.2d 223].)

[So F. No. 16839. In Bank.
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however, is no defense unless it is "between the same parties
for the same cause." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430(3).)
[3] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.Superior court actions brought under Uriemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 (Stats. 1939, p. 2051; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1939 Supp., Act 8780d), do not abate a mandamus proceeding
in the Supreme Court to test the validity of the Employment
Commission's decision that claimants are entitled to benefits
of the act, where the parties are not the same, some employers
and claimants in the mandamus proceeding not being involved
in the other actions. Moreover, the two causes of action are
not the same, an action under § 45.10 simply determining the
propriety of the employer's contribution to the fund, whereas
the mandamus proceeding is in effect an appeal to the courts
from a determination under § 67.
[4] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Payment.-No cause of action arises under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 in relation to unemployment benefits unless
they actually affect the amount of the employer's contribution
and he pays the increased amount under protest.
[5] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-The fact that plaintiffs in actions to recover unemployment contributions paid
under protest may seek to support their claims with proof
identical to that introduced in a separate mandamus proceeding to test the validity of an award of unemployment benefits,
is insufficient as a ground of abatement of the mandamus
proceeding.
[6] ld. - Remedies of Employer - Mandamus - Limitations.-A
mandamus proceeding to compel the Employment Commission
to vacate an award of unemployment benefits need not be
commenced within the time preseribed for bringing an action
under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 or § 41.1 to recover contributions alleged to have been illegally assessed
against an employer. The limitation periods prescribed in
those statutes are not made applicable by Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1109, which specifies for mandamus proceedings only the
. limitation periods prescribed in part two of that code.
[7] ld. - Remedies of Employer -Mandamus - Limitations and
Laches.-Where the Employment Commission's decision granting unemployment benefits was not released until more than
13 months from the time it was dated, and where a request
for a rehearing was denied. about two months later, it mandamus
proceeding against the commission about 22 months after the
date of said decision was within any applicable statute of
limitations, and was not barred by laches.
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--[8] Sta.tutes - Construction - Presumptions - Intent to Change
Law.-Although courts ordinarily infer an intent to change the
law from a material change in the language of a statute, the
circumstances may indicate merely a legislative intent to
clarify the law.
[9J Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Applicability to
Waiting Period.-The disqualification imposed by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), if the claimant left.his work because of a trade dispute also applied to a waiting period with
respect to unemployment even before the statute was amended
to provide specifically that during the waiting period the
claimant must be' eligible for benefits in virtually all respects
(Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 13; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Bupp.,
Act 878Od, § 57(d) (3», and the fact that claims were being
filed during such period warranted the inference that by so
amending the statute the Legislature intended simply to clarify
the law.
[10] Id. - Disqualification - Applicability to Waiting Period.Since the lapse of a waiting period with respect to unemployment is simply a prerequisite to the pAyment of benefits and
not an independent privilege conferred by the Unemployment
Insurance Act, the conditions for eligibility for benefits logically apply to the waiting period.
[l1J Id.-Initial Determination on Claim-Questions Involved.The question of eligibility for credit for the weeks of waiting
period, as well as for the actual payment of benefits, is properly raised in proceedings under Unemployment Insurance
Act, § 67, and the appeals allowed from the decisions therein,
both under the former provision that the deputy shall determine whether or not the claim is valid and, if valid, the week
with respect to which benefits shall commence, and under the
present provision that the initial determination shall include
a determination as to whether benefits are payable.
[12J Id.-Disquali1ication-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-It is not the function of the Employment Commission
to· evaluate the merits of a controversy between an employer
and his employees; ·if a trade dispute exists and the employee
leaves his work because of it, he may not receive benefits even
though his employer is in the wrong. The disqualification imposed by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), is not contingent on the merits of the controversy, and the commission
exceeds its powers when it dete:r.mines the merits of an industrial dispute and awards benefi.tsor credit for the weeks of
waiting period on the basis of that determination.
[13] Id.-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-The fact that the
Employment Commission based its decision awarding benefits

Aug. 1944]

W. R.

GRACE

& CO. v. CAL. EMP. COM.

723

[24 C.2d 720]

on errQneous grounds does not of itself warrant the issuance
of a writ of mandamus, if there was other legal justification
for the decision.
[14] Id.-Disquali1ication-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-Longshoremen who stopped working when they reached
that stage in their work at which the dock checkers, who were
· absent because of a strike, were usually employed, and longshoremen who were told by the employers not to commence
work; unless they were willing to continue without checkers or
ship clerks, were disqualified to receive benefits under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), where the evidence indicated
that the checkers were not essential to the performance of the
longshore work, as the stoppage of work was equivalent to a
leaving of work, whether the subsequent departure from the
.employer's premises was on the longshoremen's own volition
or at the employer's direction.
[16] Id.-Disquali1ication-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis. pute.-Where the absence of dock checkers and ship clerks was
. the controlling factor in the longshoremen's refusal to work
because they regarded such absence as a breach of their col~
lective bargaining agreement with 'the employers, which the
latter denied, such disagreement gave rise to a labor dispute.
It was not essential to disqualification that a dispute should
exist directly between the longshoremen and the employers i
if the former left their work because of the dispute between
the employers and the ship clerks, they in effect made the latter
: dispute their own and were within the disqualification of Un· employment Insurance Act, § 56(a).
[16J Id. - Disquali1l.cation - Temporary Disqua1i1ica.tion.-Unemployment Insurance Act, § 58(a), imposing only a temporary
disqualification on a claimant who leaves his most recent work
voluntarily and without good cause, is not applicable to a
claimant subject to the disqualification imposed by § 56(a).
[17] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-Longshoremen who were told by their employers to return to a hiring hall either before or after the commencement
of work did not leave their work within Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56 (a), unless they were told to return: to the hiring
hall because of their refusal to work without dock checkers,
who were absent because of a strike.
[18] Id..,.-Disquali1ication-:-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-Longshoreme;n who were not dispatched from a hiring
hall maintained by their union and the employers were not
disqualified under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(s), un· less they refused to be dispatched, in response to the em-
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ployer's request for longshoremen, because they would not
work without dock checkers who were absent because of a
strike.
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California
Employment Commission to vacate an award of unemployment benefits, and to correct its records by removing charges
against petitioners' accounts. Writ granted.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison
for Petitioners.
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Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Ralph
R. Plante en, Maurice P. McCaffrey, Charles P. Scully, Forrest
M. Hill, Glenn V. Walls, Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis &
Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard Gladstein for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The claimants for unemployment insurance benefits herein are longshoremen, members of Local
1-10 of the International Lougshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, District No.1, who work under a collective
bargaining agreement with the Waterfront Employers' Association, an employers' association with a membership substantially the same as that of the former Dock-Checkers Employers' Association. (See Matson Terminals, Inc., v. Oalifornia Employment Oommission, ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d
691J.) According to the findings of the Employment Commission the Ship Clerks' Union, a local belonging to the same
international as the longshoremen's union, became involved in
a dispute with one of the employers, the American-Hawaiian
Steamship Company, and on June 14, 1939, called a strike
against that company and established picket lines at its dock
in San Francisco. Relations were suspended between members of the union and members of the Dock-Checkers Employers' Association, and because of this suspension of relations,
checkers and ship clerks failed to report for work on June
17, 1939. The employers concede that because they regarded
the strike against the American-Hawaiian Steamship Compimy a violation of their agreement with the union, they refused to employ any dock-checkers or ship clerks at the San

Francisco Bay ports from June 17,1939, until the termination
of the strike on June 27, 1939.
On June 17th various gangs of longshoremen were dispatched by the hiring hall to docks operated by members of
the employers' association. At the docks some of the longshoremen were told not to start work unless they would continue without checkers or ship clerks, while others were instructed by the employers or their agents to return to the
hiring hall. Some gangs went to worl,t aboard the ships but
stopped when they reached that stage of the work where
checkers were usually employed. The men worked who were
dispatched to docks where union clerks and checkers were
not customarily required. Dock checkers and ship clerks keep
clerical records of the cargo for the employer, but do no physical work in the loading and discharging of vessels.
Approximately 5,000 longshoremen filed claims for unemployment benefits for the period from June 17, 1939, to June
27, 1939. The adjustment unit of the Division of Unemployment Insurance denied benefits on the ground that the claimants were disqualified under section 56 (a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, as amended;
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d.) Payments, however, were
erroneously made to a number of the claimants. Claiman:ts
appealed from the adver8e ruling, and the referee after hearing reversed the initial determinations and awarded benefits.
Upon the employers' appeal, the commission, with one member
dissenting, affirmed the referee's decision upon the ground
that claimants were not disqualified under section 56 (a) of
the act since the absence of checkers and ship clerks from
docks where they were formerly customarily employed was a
deviation from the customary method of working and therefore
constituted a violation by the. employers of the requirement
of the collective bargaining agreement that "present practices are to continue in effect." The commission held the
claimants eligible to certify for the weeks of waiting period
with respect to the unemployment involved, since they had
not been previously unemployed long enough to render them
eligible for benefits.
Most of the employers thereafter filed actions in the superior court to recover unemployment insurance contributions
paid under protest. The employers also petitioned the District
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Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, for
a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its
decision and to correct its records by removing therefrom any
charges against the employers for payments to claimants for
the period from June 17 to June 27,1939. The District Court
of Appeal issued the writ and vacated the commission's decision. Thereafter, upon the petition of the commission and of
claimants, who are interveners in the proceeding, this court
granted a hearing. By stipulation the case was submitted on
the record of the proceedings before the commission with the
reservation of the right to try before the court the question
whether the parties should have the right to try the case de
novo but the question as to this right was not argued.
The commission and claimants contend that the employers
are not entitled to the writ, on the ground that they have not
exhausted their administrative remedies and can secure adequate relief under the provisions of section 41.1 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp.,
Act 8780d, § 41.1; Stats. 1941, ch. 940, p. 2535, § 2.) This
contention is answered adversely in Matson Terminals, Inc.,
v. California Emp. Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202].
Their contention that the writ should be denied because the
charges to the employers' accounts involved in this proceeding
are also the subject of the actions pending in the superior
court is likewise without merit. [1] The writ of mandamus
is not so exceptional in nature, as petitioners suggest, that it
is never abated by the pendency of other litigation. Although
it was originally a hig"J. prerogative writ to which the plea of
another action pending was not available (George v. Beaty,
85 Cal.App. 525, 528 [260 P. 386] ; Calaveras County v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325, 337; United States Protective Ass'n v. Board
of Police Commrs., 14 Gal.App. 249 [111 P. 755] ; Gray v. Mullins, 15 Cal.App. 118 [113 P. 694] ), it no longer depends upon
prerogative power (Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 10 Cal.App. 534,
537 [102 P. 677] ; Barnes v. Glide, 117 Cal. 1, 5-6 [48 P. 804, 59
Am.St.Rep. 153] ; see 16 Cal.Jur. 763; Hart, An Introduction
to Administrative Law, p. 439) and is by statute expressly
subject to the rules of pl'actice applicable to other actions
when there are no provisions otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc"
§§ 1109, 1089; Taylor v. Burks, 6 Cal.App. 225, 228 [91 P.
814] ; Jones v. Board of Police Commrs., 141 Cal. 96 [74 P.

Aug. 19M]

W. It

GRACE

&

CO. V. CAL. :ElMP. COM.
[24 C.2d 720]

"121

696] ; Barnes v. Glide, supraj see Scott v. Superior Court, 83
Cal.App. 25, 30 [256 P. 603] ; People v. Board of Supervisors,
27 Cal. 655.) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
thus made applicable to mandamus proceedings include those
allowing the defense of "another action pending between the
saine parties for the same cause." (Code Civ. Prov., §§ 430,
433; Goytino v. McAleer, ,4 Cal.App. 655, 659-660 [88 P.
991].) [2] The writ is therefore denied if a similar application between the same parties on the same matter is already
pending before another court. (Goytino v. McAleer, supraj
McMullen v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist., 17 Cal.App.2d 696, 701702 [62 P.2d 1083].) The pendency of another action, however, is no defense unless it is "between the same parties for
the same cause." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430 (3); Knapp v.
Knapp, 15 Cal.2d 237, 243 [100 P.2d 759]; Schoonover v.
Birnbaum, 150 Cal. 734, 736 [89 P. 1108] ; Capuccio v. Caire,
189 Cal. 514, 528 [209 P. 367] ; McCormick v. Gross, 135 Cal.
302 [67 P. 766] ; O'Hara v. Grand Lodge 1. O. G. T., 213 Cal.
131, 144 [2 P.2d 21] ; see 1 Cal.Jur. 28-29, 31.) [3] The superior court actions, which in the view of the commission and
claimants abate the present proceedings, are suits to recover
unemployment insurance contributions paid by the employers
under protest, brought under authority of section 45.10 of the
Unemployment Insurance Act. The parties are not the same,
for some' employers who are petitioners herein, and claimants
who are intervenors herein, are not involved. Moreover,
those actions challenge the propriety of other contributions in
addition to those affected by the commission's decision in the
present case, and the two causes of action are not the same.
The present petition for a writ of mandamus is to test the
validity of the commission's decision that claimants are entitled to the benefits of the Unemployment Insurance Act in
the form of payments or credit for the weeks of waiting period, and is in effect an appeal to the courts from a determination under section 67 of the act. An action under section
45.10 is entirely different, simply determining the propriety
of the employer's contributions to the fund. (Bodinson Mfg.
Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d
935] ; Matson Terminals, Inc., v. California Employment Commi:ssion, supra.) Section 67 allows any employer "whose reserve' account may be affected by the payment of benefits to
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any individual formerly in his employ" to become an interested party to the proceeding to determine the validity of the
claimant's application for benefits. [4] No cause of action
arises under section 45.10 in relation to those benefits unless
they actually affect the amount of the employer's contribution
and he pays the increased amount under protest. The employer's protest of the amount of the contribution assessed
against him may be based upon various grounds having no
relation to the validity of benefits paid, and in the present
case it is not clear from the complaints in the superior court
action that the plaintiffs therein are attempting in that action
to challenge the legality of the commission's decision involved
in this proceeding. [5] The fact that they may upon a
trial seek to support their claims with identical proof is insufficient as a ground of abatement. (Hall v. Susskind, 109
Cal. 203 [41 P. 1012].)
[6] Claimants contend that the present proceeding is
barred by the statute of limitations, and argue that it should
have been commenced within the time prescribed for bringing
an action under sections 45.10 or 41.1 to recover contributions
alleged to have been illegally assessed against an employer.
Actions brought under those sections, however, not only differ
substantially from the proceedings for mandamus involved
herein (Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. Oalifornia Employment Oom.,
supra; Matson Terminals, Inc., v; Oalifornia Employment
Oom., supra) but the limitation periods prescribed in
those statutes clearly were intended to apply only to actions
brought thereunder. They are not made applicable by section
1109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies for mandamus proceedings only the limitation periods prescribed in
part two of that code. (Code Civ Proc., § 1109; Jones v. Board
of Police Oommrs., 141 Cal. 96 [74 P. 696] ; Dillon v. Board
of Pension Oommrs., 18 Cal.2d 427 [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R.
800] .) No provision thereof that would bar the present proceeding has been cited. Section 343 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, referring to actions not otherwise provided for in
the preceding sections of the code, provides simply that such
actions must be commenced within four years after accrual of
the cause of action. [7] In the present case the commission's decision, though dated April 3, 1940, was not released
until May 21, 1941, and the petition for rehearing was not
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denied until July 19, 1941. The petition for the writ in the
present action was filed in February, 1942. This period is
well within any applicable statute of limitations, and no facts
alleged indicate any laches on the part of petitioners. (See
Scott v. Superior Oourt, 205 Cal. 525 [271 P. 906] ; Hayman
v. Oity of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 680-681 [62 P.2d
1047].)
The commission and claimants contend that the commission's decision that claimants are eligible to certify for the
weeks of waiting period with respect to the unemployment
involved, instead of for benefits, prevents application of the
disqualification of section 56 (a) since that section refers only
to eligibility for benefits. They point out that after the period
of unemployment here involved the Unemployment Insurance Act was amended to provide specifically that during the
waiting period the claimant must be eligible for benefits in
virtually all respects (Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp., Act
8780d, § 57 (d) (3); Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 13), and contend
that this amendment should not be applied retroactively. The
fact that the statute was thus amended, however, does not
necessarily indicate that the law was different before the
amendment. [8) Although courts ordinarily infer an intent to change the law from a material change in the language
of a statute (People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 118 [255 P. 792,
52 A.L.R. 811] ; Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11 Ca1.2d 746 [82 P.2d
1] ; see Crawford, Statutory Construction [1940], p. 618), the
circumstances may indicate merely a legislative intent to
clarify the law (Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Ca1.2d 275,
278-279 [115 P.2d 425] ; Martin v. Oalifornia Mut. B. &; L.
Ass'n, 18 Cal.2d 478, 484 [116 P.2d 71] ; San Joaquin Ginning 00. v. McOolgan, 20 Ca1.2d 254, 263-264 [125 P.2d 36]) ;
see 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, [3d ed., 1943] pp.
415, 416, 418). [9] In the present case the fact that claims
were being filed in situations such as the present one is enough
to warrant the inference that the Legislature intended simply
to clarify the law (see Union League Club v. Johnson, supraj
San Joaquin Ginning 00. v. McOolgan, supra), since even
before the amendment the eligibility requirements for the payment of benefits were properly applicable to the waiting period. (Matter of Munterfering, 256 App.Div. 151 [9 N.Y.S.
2d 830] ; see Martin v. Oalifornia Mut. B. &; L. Ass'n, supra.)
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The various disqualifications on eligibility for benefits imposed by the act then in effect clearly indicate that they weve
intended to apply as well to the waiting period. For example,
the act provided that a claimant was not eligible for benefits
unless he was physically able to work and available for work
whenever called on by his employer and had registered as unemployed and for work (2 Deering's Gen. Laws 1937, Act
8780 (d), § 51), and that he was not eligible for benefits for
any week in which he had suitable employment (Ibid., § 52).
The waiting period commenced from the date of his registration (Ibid., § 65), but if immediately thereafter he became
physically unable to work or was unavailable for work or obtained suitable employment, he would not be entitled to credit
for the weeks of waiting period. [10] Since the lapse of the
waiting period is simply a prereq~isite to the payment of
benefits and not an independent privilege conferred by the
act, the conditions for eligibility for benefits logically apply
to the waiting period. (Matter of Munterfering, 256 App.
Div. 151 [9 N.Y.S. 2d 830].) Thus, the disqualification imposed by section 56 if the claimant left his work because of a
trade dispute also applied to the waiting period even before
the statute specifically so provided. No question of retroactive interpretation of the amendment is therefore involved.
[11] The question of eligibility for credit for the weeks of
waiting period as well as for the actual payment of benefits is
properly raised in proceedings under section 67 of the act
and the appeals allowed from the decisions therein, both under
the former provision that the deputy shall determine whether
or not the claim is valid and if valid the week with respect to
which benefits shall commence (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937,
Act 8780d, § 67), and under the present provision that the
initial determination shall include a determination as to
whether benefits are payable. (Stats. 1939, ch. 1085, § 3;
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939, Act 8780d, § 67.)
Petitioners contend that claimants left their work because
of a trade dispute and are therefore disqualified under section
56 (a) of the act. (Stats. 1939, ch. 7, § 4; Deering's Gen.
Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 56 (a).) It is their view that
even though the checkers were locked out, their presence was
not physically essential to performance of longshore work,
and that the commission in determining whether claimants
had left their work because of a trade dispute could not properly consider the question. whether the checkers' absence cre.

ated a condition of work in violation of the longshoremen's
collective bargaining agreement.
[12] It is not the function of the commission to evaluate
the merits of a controversy between an employer and his employeeS!; if a trade dispute exists and the employee leaves his
work bel'ause of it, he may not receive benefits even though his
employer is in the wrong. In some states the unemployment
insurance acts specifically provide that workers shall not be
ineligible for benefits if the labor dispute is caused by the
failure or refusal of the employer to conform to the provisions
of any agreement or contract between the employer and employee (2 C.C.R. Unemployment Insurance Service 6214-6215,
par. 4034 [Ariz.]; Ibid.; p. 7217, par. 4042 [Ark.]; 4 Ibid.,
p. 32,213, par. 4028 [N.R.]), but the disqualification imposed
by section 56 (a) is not contingent upon the merits of the
controversy nor was it intended that the commission should
become an arbitrator of industrial disputes. The commission
therefore exceeded its powers when'it determined the merits
of the dispute in the present case and awarded benefits or
credit for the weeks of waiting period on the basis of that
determination.
[13] The fact that the commission based its decision upon
erroneous grounds, however, does not of itself warrant the
issuance of the writ, if there was other legal justification for
the decision. (Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 46-47 [17 Am.Rep.
405]; Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 28-30 [251 P.
784] .) In the present case the commission's findings of fact
grouped claimants into three classifications: (1) those longshoremen who upon reporting at the docks were told by the
employers or their agents not to begin work unless they were
willing to continue without checkers; (2) those who stopped
working when they reached that stage in their work where
checkers are usually employed; and (3) those who were told
by the employers to return to the hiring hall, either before or
after they had begun work.
[14] Those longshoremen who stopped working when they
reached that stage in their work where checkers were usually
employed and those who were told by the employers not t()
commence work unless they were willing to continue without
checkers or ship clerks are disqualified under the provisions
of section 56 (a). (Matson Terminals, Inc., v. California
Employment Commission, ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202];
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American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. v. California Employment
Commission, ante, p. 716 [151 P.2d 213].) Although the
commission states in its decision that it was customary for
certain work to be done by checkers or clerks and that they
were customarily employed at some of the docks, there was no
finding that the longshoremen could not do their work without
checkers, and the evidence before the commission indicated
that they were not essential to the performance of the longshore work. The stoppage of wor~ therefore could not be attributed to any physical inability to continue, and was equivalent to a leaving of work, whether the subsequent departure
from the employer's premises was on the longshoremen's
own volition or at the employer's direction. [15] The commission and claimants contend, however, that even if claimants
left their work, they did not leave because of a trade dispute,
but because of a condition of work resulting from a trade dispute, namely, the absence of the checkers or ship clerks. There
is little question, however, that the absence of the checkers
and ship clerks gave rise to a trade dispute between the employers and the longshoremen independent of the dispute
existing between the employers and the ship clerks, for the
uncontradicted evidence shows that the longshoremen contended that their collective bargaining agreement required
the presence of the ship clerks, while the employers contended
that the agreement was not violated by their absence and that
even if it were, the longshoremen's remedy under that agreement lay in arbitration. It may be that a clear violation by
an employer of a definite and unambiguous term of his contract would constitute the imposition of a more onerous condition of employment rather than a matter subject to a labor
dispute. (See 3 C.C.R. Unemployment Insurance Service,
par. 1f180.155, par. 1980.02.) If, however, the alleged violation is of a general provision, as in the present case, and is
denied by the employer, the disagreement gives rise to a labor
dispute. Although the commission made the general findings
that" no dispute existed between last employer and claimants
herein," this finding is nullified by other findings, supported
by uncontradicted evidence, indicating that the absence of
checkers and ship clerks was the controlling factor in the
longshoremen's refusal to work because they regarded it as
a breach of the collective barg-aining agreement. Since the
finding that no dispute existed was coupled with the finding
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that "none of the claimants herein are members of the Ship
Clerks' Union," it was apparently intended to refer only to
the original dispute between the ship clerks and the employers.
Moreover, it was not essential to disqualification that a dispute exist directly between the longshoremen and the employers; if the former left their work because of the dispute
between the employers and the ship clerks, they in effect made
the latter dispute their own and are within the disqualification of section 56 (a). (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California
Emp. Com., 17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935].)
[16] The commission and claimants contend that in any
event the award in the present case is justified by the provitions of section 58 (a) of the act imposing only a temporary
disqualification upon a claimant who leaves his most recent
work voluntarily and without good cause. They contend that
if the claimants be held to have left their work voluntarily,
they should be subject to no more severe penalty than that
imposed by section 58 (a) since no formal strike was called by
the longshoremen's union and no picket line was established
by them, and since those who refused to work did so because
of changed conditions of employment. The disqualification
imposed by that section, however, is not applicable to a claimant subject to the disqualification imposed by section 56 (a).
(See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra.)
[17] Those claimants, however, in the third classification
described above, who were told by their employers to return to
the hiring hall either before or after the commencement of
work, did not leave their work within the meaning of section
56 (a) unless they were told to return to the hirmg hall because of their refusal to work without checkers. The commission's finding is uncertain in this regard. [18] It appears from the record of the proceedings before the commission that some of the claimants were never dispatched from
the hiring hall, although there is evidence that during the
period of the dispute between June 17th and June 27th orders
for longshoremen were placed by the employers with the dispatcher at the hiring hall that were not filed. These claimant£ are not disqualrfied under section 56 (a) unless they
refused to be dispatched, in response to the employers' request for longshoremen because they would not work without
checkers. There should be a finding by the commission in
answer to this question. Moreover, the commission did not
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identify the claimants that were within the various classifications discussed earlier. The commission should therefore be
required to take whatever additional evidence is necessary
and to make determinations as to the individual claimants in
accord with the views herein expressed. (See Bila v. Young,
20 CaI.2d 865, 870 [129 P.2d 364] ; Helvering v. Rankin, 295
U.S. 123, 131 [55 S.Ot. 732, 79 L.Ed. 1343] ; Federal Communioations Com. v. Pottsville Broadoasting 00.,309 U.S. 134,
145 [60 S.Ot. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656] ; Helvering v. Smith, 132 F.
2d 965, 968.)
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue ordering the commission to proceed as herein directed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent upon the same grounds as set forth
in my dissenting opinion in Matson Terminals, 1'11,0., v. Oalifornia Emp. Com;, this day filed, ante, p. 711 [151 P.2d
211].
In this case, however, the initial determination by the adjustment unit was against the employees. On appeal the
referee allowed benefits, and the allowance was affirmed by
the commission. The unemployment occurred in June, 1939.
At that time section 67 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act as amended in 1937 was in effect, and it provided
that benefits were payable regardless of any appeal where
there had been either an allowance of benefits by the adjustment unit followed by an affirmance by the referee or an allowance by a referee followed by an affirmance by the commission (Stats. 1937, p. 2059). Although the proceedings to
determine the claim for benefits occurred after the 1939
amendment went into effect, there is nothing in that amendment to indicate that it is retroactive. The right to benefits
regardless of appeal is a substantive right which should not
be defeated by a subsequent change in the law at least unless
such an intent clearly appears.
In my opinion the writ should be denied.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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BUNNY'S WAFFLE SHOP, INC. (a Corporation) et aI.,
Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et aI., Respondents; MITCHELL VEZILICH
et aI., Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Unemployment Relief - Disquali1l.cation - Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute. - Unemployment Insurance Act,
§ 56(a) (Stats.1935, p.1226, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1937, Act 878Od), does not disqualify an employee from receiving benefits in all cases where his unemployment results
directly or indirectly from a labor dispute, but makes him
ineligible only if he left his work because of the dispute. There
must therefore be a direct causal connection between the trade
dispute and the leaving of work.
[2a, 2b] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade
Dispute.-Restaurant employees were not disqualified by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), from receiving benefits
because they left work in the course of a trade dispute, where
a reduction of wages and changes to more onerous conditions
of work, which were not subjects of the dispute, were imposed
by the employers for the sole purpose of coercing the ememployees' unions into bargaining collectively with the employers' representative, and were to continue only until the unions
agreed to do so. The employees left their work because of
this economic weapon, and not because of the trade dispute
then in existence.
.
[3] Labor - Economic Pressure Activities. - A strike sanction
merely indicates approval by a central agency of a possible
strike, and is primarily a threat of economic action.
[4] Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Leaving Work Because of Trade Dispute.-A strike against a single member of
an employers' collective bargaining unit involves economic
action against that employer only, and subjects to disqualification under the Unemployment Insurance Act those employees
only who leave their work because of the dispute. If the other
employers thereupon choose to close their establishments and
[1] See 11 Oal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "Unemployment Reserves and Social Security."
:M:cK. Dig. References: [1,2,4, 6J Unemployment Relief; [3,5]
Labor, § 20a.

